In cuvantarea solemna a presedintelui rostita cu ocazia comemorarii unificarii de la 1859, acesta sau cel care i-a scris discursul afirma ca multe dintre telurile generatiei ce a infaptuit Unirea sunt si astazi teluri ale elitei romanesti.

Mult adevar si dureros de reale sunt aceste cuvinte. Basescu, involuntar a recunoscut una din marile carente ale multor care astazi sunt, mai mult datorita pozitiei vremelnice ce o ocupa, parte a elitei romanesti. Traitul in trecut!!!

Ce lucruri marete poate realiza un sef de stat si un partid politic care traieste in trecut. Se pare ca Basescu (si nu numai el) traieste inca in proiectele Romaniei din secolul XIX, proiecte ce au fost realizate de altfel. Modernizarea Romaniei a fost un proiect grandios dar acesta s-a terminat de peste 100 de ani.

Basescu este si el un produs al unei educatii comunistoide ce astazi isi arata carentele, astazi cand avem in varful ierarhiei statului un om ce nu poate oferi solutii si care pana acum nu a oferit un proiect coerent care sa duca Romania pe un nivel superior al dezvoltarii sale.

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7 comentarii

  1. „Modernizarea Romaniei a fost un proiect grandios dar acesta s-a terminat de peste 100 de ani”…. am impresia ca traiesti in trecut d-le istoric si politician. Daca procesul de modernizare s-a terminat …. hmmm, avem o problema. Mare problema. Ce facem acum? Dumneavoastra in ce epoca traiti? In aia moderna de amu 100 de ani? Sau in asta cenusie de azi? Toate-s vechi si noua toate!

  2. pt oare?

    merci pentru comentariu. esti exact ceea ce cautam. un exemplu de om ce traieste in trecut, produs al unei educatii comunistoide.

  3. sigur asta cautai? hehe…. ma bucur. insa, in acelasi timp imi pare rau ca va etalati iarasi mentalul retard. eu am pus o intrebare. excelenta voastra … ati dat un calificativ … evident (pseudo)liberal si imbecil. spor in continuare la articolele sofisticate din sibiu 100%. Sunt demne de dvs.

  4. pt oare?

    daca prima data observam ca esti un reprezentant demn al unui om ce traieste in trecut, produs al unei educatii comunistoide, imi dau seama ca prin aceasta noua postare am gresit un pic aprecierea. esti intradevar un om ce traieste in trecut dar se pare ca am exagerat evaluarea mea cand ma gandeam si la educatie. sfatul meu este sa pui mana sa citesti cateva carti intai (ti-as recomanda si ceva modernist pe intelesul tau ca si Creanga, Caragiale sau Eminescu dar si ceva post modernist, poate Cartarescu) si apoi permite-ti a posta pe bloguri si sa iti dai cu parerea.

  5. posibil sa fiu produs al educatiei comunistoide (se pare ca ati invatat un cuvant nou care va place). „evaluarea” dvs nu conteaza decat pt orgoliul propriu, in rest nu are nici-o utilitate. ma intreb insa…acel personaj care de dragul latratului ieftin in fata stapanului Crin aproape ca aducea osanale lui tatuca Iliescu, cel care a comandat direct bataia unchiului dvs. :) oare cine are o educatie …? ei bun, ne oprim aici pt ca sigur nu sunteti un om echilibrat iar moralitatea dvs este mai mult decat indoielnica. nu cred ca aveti inca discernamantul de a analiza ceea ce spuneti. in ceea ce-l priveste pe Cartarescu, recunosc, nu ma dau in vant dupa scriitura sa. (ceea ce, in minte aunui tanar politician si istoric sibian, evident, este o dovada a educatiei comunistoide)

  6. pt oare?

    vezi de ce sunt bune cartile, te invata sa nu generalizezi. m-ai auzit, vazut pe mine sa aduc osanale lui Iliescu si PSD-ului? Nu generaliza doar ca nu ai alt motiv de acuzare.

  7. La Wikipedia,( the free encyclopedia) Nu exista traducere in romana la notiunile care ar interesa pe victimele abuzurilor si crimelor (roluldat de portughezul Barroso lui Leonard Orban comisar roman pe multilingvism)

    Popular may refer to:
    • an adjective referring to any people or population
    • Social status, the quality of being well-liked or well-known
    • Popularity, the quality of being well-liked.
    • The mainstream, the quality of being common, well-received, in demand
    o Popular culture, popular fiction, popular music
    • Populace, the total population of a certain place
    o Populism, a political philosophy seeking to use the instruments of the state to benefit the people as a whole
    o Populous, a 1989 computer game, the seminal god game; see also Populous (series)
    • Popular (TV series), a teenage dramedy on The WB
    • Popular Holdings, a Singapore-based educational book company
    • Popular, Inc., a Puerto Rican-based financial services company, also known as Banco Popular inc

    Right-wing populism
    languagesDeutsch Suomi

    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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    Right-wing populism (also known as radical right-wing populism) is a political strategy and rhetorical style combining right-wing ideology with populist propaganda and campaigning. The term in particular refers to the movements connected with neoliberalism which first rose to prominence during the 1980s.[1] Right-wing populism is a core element of several New Right political parties and movements in contemporary Europe.[2] European radical right populists founded the Euronat association in 2005.
    The strategy of right-wing populism relies on a combination of ethno-nationalism with anti-elitist populist rhetoric and a radical critique of existing political institutions.[3][4][5][6]
    Right-wing populist parties and movements differ from many far right parties in that they accept representative democracy and disavow violent political tactics. They are considered radical because they oppose the current welfare state and the present political system; right-wing because they oppose aspects of social democracy and have traditional policies on immigration; and populist because they appeal to the fears and frustrations of common citizens.[7] These parties and movements sometimes distinguish themselves from the traditional Right by their support for social welfare programmes, gender equality, gay rights, and separation of church and state. These parties often present themselves as the defenders of traditional liberal ideas.[8] Other RRP parties wish to preserve the dominance of the Christian values as a means of preserving the national culture.
    Some scholars see populist movements potentially serving as a precursor creating the building blocks of fascist movements.[9][10][11] For example, conspiracist scapegoating employed by various populist movements can create „a seedbed for fascism” in the United States, argues Mary Rupert.[12] Mark Rupert sees echoes of this in some far-right isolationist movements that view globalization as a threat to American interests.[13] Hans-Georg Betz describes the radical right populist parties’ anti-immigration policies as „a thinly veiled racism” and states that they opportunistically exploit the xenophobic response created by a new age of globalisation and a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural world. Other researchers have found that right-wing populist parties draw voters who are concerned about the cultural impact of immigration, poor economic conditions, and perceived unresponsiveness of mainstream political parties.[14]
    [] Canada

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    Right-wing populism emerged in Canada in the 1990s under Preston Manning and the Reform Party of Canada. The movement (which was heavily based in Western Canada), was over discontent with Brian Mulroney, Red Toryism, a perception of an eastern-Canadian-centric political arena, and opposition to (among other issues), bilingualism, high taxes, and federalism detracting from provincial control over natural resources (and thus wealth). Since the Canadian Alliance (successor to the party) merged with the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada, the movement has largely diminished. Stephen Harper however (who formerly led the Canadian Alliance and was a co-founder of the Reform Party), did take (and still holds) leadership of the Conservative Party of Canada. Furthermore, Stockwell Day is serving as Minister of Public Safety under Harper’s 39th Canadian Parliament). Unlike the general definition of right-wing populism, the Reform Party’s platforms were not based on ethnic nationalism. It was however accused of being homophobic, racist, and sexist (although it did run Rahim Jaffer as a candidate, who became the first Muslim MP in the Canadian House of Commons).
    In Weimar Germany, radical right-wing populism played a role in mobilizing middle class support for the Nazi Party.[15]. In this case, distressed middle–class populists during the pre-Nazi Weimar period mobilized their anger at government and big business. The Nazis „parasitized the forms and themes of the populists and moved their constituencies far to the right through ideological appeals involving demagoguery, scapegoating, and conspiracism”.[16] According to Fritzsche:
    The Nazis expressed the populist yearnings of middle–class constituents and at the same time advocated a strong and resolutely anti-Marxist mobilization….Against “unnaturally” divisive parties and querulous organized interest groups, National Socialists cast themselves as representatives of the commonwealth, of an allegedly betrayed and neglected German public….[b]reaking social barriers of status and caste, and celebrating at least rhetorically the populist ideal of the people’s community… [17]
    The German Republicans had seats in the European parliament in 1983. In the 2000s, the Republicans’ support eroded in favour of the far right National Democratic Party of Germany, which in 2005 held 1.6% of the popular vote (regionally winning up to 9%).
    ] Switzerland
    Main article: Far right in Switzerland
    In Switzerland the right-wing populist Swiss People’s Party reached an all-time high in the 2007 elections. In Switzerland, radical right populist parties held close to 10% of the popular vote in 1971, were reduced to below 2% by 1979, and again grew to more than 10% in 1991. Since 1991, these parties (the Swiss Democrats and the Swiss Freedom Party) have been absorbed by the Swiss People’s Party, whose aggressively right-wing, populist campaign catapulted it to 29% of the popular vote in 2007.
    [United States
    In the United States, radical right-wing populism can be traced back to the Jacksonian period and the rise of the Ku Klux Klan in the mid-19th century following the Civil War. In the U.S. it has often incorporated an agrarian impulse.[18][19][20]
    [See also
    • New Right
    ] References
    1. ^ Herbert Kitschelt (1996), The Radical Right Wing in Western Europe, Univ. of Michigan Press; Jean-Yves Camus (2006), Die europäische extreme Rechte: ein populistisches und ultraliberales Projekt, in: Peter Bathke / Susanne Spindler (eds.): Neoliberalismus und Rechtsextremismus in Europa. Zusammenhänge – Widersprüche – Gegenstrategien, Berlin, pp. 34-47).
    2. ^ Jens Rydgren. „Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties: The Case of Denmark” West European Politics, Vol. 27, No. 3, May 2004, pp. 474–502.”
    3. ^ Canovan, Margaret. 1981. Populism.
    4. ^ Fritzsche, Peter. 1990. Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany.
    5. ^ Betz, Hans-Georg (1994). Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0312083908.
    6. ^ Berlet, Chip and Matthew N. Lyons. 2000. Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort.
    7. ^ Patton
    8. ^ Tjitske Akkerman, „Anti-immigration parties and the defence of liberal values: The exceptional case of the List Pim Fortuyn,” Journal of Political Ideologies (October 2005), 10(3), 337–354.
    9. ^ Ferkiss 1957.
    10. ^ Dobratz and Shanks–Meile 1988
    11. ^ Berlet and Lyons, 2000
    12. ^ Mary Rupert 1997: 96.
    13. ^ Mark Rupert 1997.
    14. ^ David Jesuit; Vincent Mahler (August 2004) (PDF). Electoral Support for Extreme Right-Wing Parties: A Subnational Analysis of Western European Elections in the 1990s. Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), asbl. http://www.lisproject.org/publications/liswps/391.pdf.
    15. ^ Fritzsche 1990: 149-150, 1998
    16. ^ Berlet 2005.
    17. ^ Fritzsche 1990: 233-235)
    18. ^ Berlet & Lyons
    19. ^ Kazin, Michael. 1995.The Populist Persuasion: An American History.
    20. ^ Stock, Catherine McNicol. 1996. Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American Grain.
    New Right
    From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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    For the European New Right,, see Nouvelle Droite.
    For the British national anarchist group of this name, see New Right (UK).
    For Georgian liberal conservative party, see New Right (Georgia).

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    Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (October 2006)

    New Right is used in several countries as a descriptive term for various policies and/or groups that are right-wing. It has also been used to describe the emergence of Eastern European parties after the collapse of communism.[1]
    ] New Right by country
    [] Australia
    In Australia the „New Right” refers to a movement in the late 1970s and 1980s which advocated economically liberal and increased socially conservative policies (as opposed to the „old right” which advocated economically conservative policies), and small-l liberals with more socially liberal views. Unlike the United Kingdom and United States, but like neighbouring New Zealand, the Australian Labor Party initiated many „New Right” policy reforms (the Third Way), but desisted from others, such as wholesale labour market deregulation (eg WorkChoices), a GST, the privatisation of Telstra and welfare reform including „work for the dole”, which John Howard and the Liberal Party of Australia were to initiate. The H. R. Nicholls Society, a think tank which advocates full workplace deregulation, contains some Liberal MPs as members and is seen to be of the New Right.
    Economic liberalism, also called Economic Rationalism in Australia, was first used by Labor’s Gough Whitlam.[2] It is a philosophy which tends to advocate a free market economy, increased deregulation, privatisation, lower direct taxation and higher indirect taxation, and a reduction of the size of the Welfare State. The politicians favouring New Right ideology were referred to as „dries”, while those advocating continuation of the economic policies of the post-war consensus, typically Keynesian economics, and/or were more socially liberal, were called „wets” (the term „wets” was similarly used in Britain to refer to those Conservatives who opposed Thatcherite economic policies, but „dries” in this context was much rarer in British usage).
    New political Forum/Group /think-tank has been formed in Croatia. This Forum draws mainly inspiration from thinkers and politicians who are virtually unknown in todays Croatia such as: Dr. Ivo Pilar,Dr. Milan pl. Sufflay,Kerubin Segvic,Stjepan Freiherr Sarkotic von Lovcen, modern Croatian thinkers such as: Tomislav Jonjic, and intellectuals such as: Julius Evola. Main inspiration behind the group are: Dr. Tomislav Sunic and outside of Croatia: Alain De Benoist and Georges Dumezil.
    In France, the New Right (or Nouvelle Droite) has been used as a term to describe a modern think-tank of French political philosophers and intellectuals led by Alain de Benoist. Although accused by some critics as being „far-right” in their beliefs, they themselves claim that their ideas transcend the traditional „left/right” divide and actively encourages free debate.
    ] Germany
    In Germany, the „Neue Rechte” (literally, new right) consists of two parts: the „Jungkonservative” (literally, young conservatives), who search for followers in the civically part of the population; and, secondly, the „Nationalrevolutionäre” (national revolutionists), who are looking for followers in the ultra-right part of the German population, and use the rhetorics of right-wing politicians such as Gregor and Otto Strasser.
    The New Right is the name of a political party in the Netherlands.
    [New Zealand

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    In New Zealand, as in Australia, it was the Labour Party that initially adopted „New Right” economic policies, while also pursuing social liberal stances such as decriminalisation of male homosexuality, pay equity for women and adopting a nuclear-free policy. This meant temporary realignment within New Zealand politics, as „New Right” middle-class voters voted Labour at the New Zealand general election 1987 due to approval of its economic policies. At first, Labour corporatised many former government departments and state assets, then emulated the Conservative Thatcher administration and privatised them altogether during Labour’s second term of office. However, recession and privatisation together led to increasing strains within the Labour Party, which led to schism, and the exit of Jim Anderton and his NewLabour Party, which later formed part of the Alliance Party with the Greens and other opponents of New Right economics.
    However, dissent and schism were not to be limited to the Labour Party and Alliance Party alone. During the Labour Party’s second term in office, National selected Ruth Richardson as Opposition finance spokesperson, and when National won the 1990 general election, Richardson became Minister of Finance, while Jenny Shipley became Minister of Social Welfare. Richardson introduced deunionisation legislation, known as the Employment Contracts Act, in 1991, while Shipley presided over social welfare benefit cuts, designed to reduce „welfare dependency” – both core New Right policy initiatives.
    In the early nineties, maverick National MP Winston Peters also came to oppose New Right economic policies, and led his elderly voting bloc out of the National Party. As a result, his New Zealand First anti-monetarist party has become a coalition partner to both National (1996–1998) and Labour (2005- ) led coalition governments. Due to the introduction of the MMP electoral system, a New Right „Association of Consumers and Taxpayers” party, known as ACT New Zealand was formed by ex-Labour New Right-aligned Cabinet Ministers like Richard Prebble and others, and maintaining existing New Right policy initiatives such as the Employment Contracts Act, while also introducing US-style „welfare reform.” ACT New Zealand aspired to become National’s centre-right coalition partner, but has been hampered by lack of party unity and populist leadership that often lacked strategic direction.
    As for Labour and National themselves, their fortunes have been mixed. Labour was out of office for most of the nineties, only regaining power when Helen Clark led it to victory and a Labour/Alliance coalition and centre-left government (1999–2002). However, the Alliance disintegrated in 2002.
    National was defeated in 1999 due to the absence of a suitable, stable coalition partner given New Zealand First’s partial disintegration after Winston Peters abandoned the prior National-led coalition. When Bill English took over National, it was thought that he might lead the Opposition away from its prior hardline New Right economic and social policies, but his indecisiveness and lack of firm policy direction led to ACT New Zealand gaining the New Right middle-class voting basis in 2002. When Don Brash took over, New Right middle-class voters returned to National’s fold, causing National’s revival in fortunes at the New Zealand general election 2005. However, at the same time, ACT New Zealand strongly criticised it for deviating from its former New Right economic policy perspectives, and at the same election, National did little to enable ACT’s survival. ACT currently has two Members of Parliament, and its survival depends on whether or not ACT leader Rodney Hide can retain his Epsom electorate seat at the next general election. Furthermore, Don Brash resigned as National party leader, being replaced by John Key, who is seen as a more moderate National MP.
    As for the centre-left, Helen Clark and her Labour-led coalition have been criticised from ex-Alliance members and non-government organisations for their alleged lack of attention to centre-left social policies, while trade union membership has recovered due to Labour’s repeal of the Employment Contracts Act 1991 and labour market deregulation and the deunionisation that had accompanied it in the nineties. It is plausible that Clark and her Cabinet are influenced by Tony Blair and his British Labour Government, which pursues a similar balancing act between social and fiscal responsibility while in government. Also had a cap
    In Romania, the nationalist organization „Noua Dreaptă” (New Right) was founded in 2000. In 2006, Noua Dreaptă staged a peaceful anti-gay rally in Bucharest. The organization uses the paraphernalia of interwar Iron Guard and practices a cult of personality towards the slain Iron Guard leader Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. Noua Dreaptă is an active member of the far right European National Front.
    South Korea
    In South Korea, the „New Right” movement is a Korean attempt at neoconservative politics.
    Some well known politicians from the „old right” GNP indicated commonality with the New Right groups, including Park Geun-hye (former leader of the GNP) who endorsed the New Right’s ‘Alternative Korean History Textbook’ in a symposium.[citation needed]
    Some New Right leaders have joined the GNP. Shin Ji-ho, a former leftist activist and now one of the best-known New Right activists, joined the GNP and became a member of the National Assembly of South Korea.
    [United Kingdom
    Philosophy: New Right ideas were developed in the early eighties and took a distinctive view of elements of society such as family, education, crime and deviance. In the United Kingdom, the term New Right more specifically refers to a strand of Conservatism that the likes of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan influenced. Thatcher’s style of New Right ideology, known as Thatcherism, was heavily influenced by the work of Friedrich Hayek (in particular the book The Road to Serfdom). They were ideologically committed to neo-liberalism as well as being socially conservative. Key policies included deregulation of business, a dismantling of the welfare state, privatization of nationalized industries and restructuring of the national workforce in order to increase industrial and economic flexibility in an increasingly global market. Similar policies were continued by the subsequent Conservative government under John Major and the mark of the New Right is evident in the New Labour government, first under Tony Blair, then Gordon Brown.
    Influential figures:
    Margaret Thatcher – Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
    John Redwood – Conservative MP.
    Chubb, John E. and Moe, Terry M – New Right theorists who spoke about education in their book „Politics, Markets and America’s Schools”
    [United States
    In the United States, New Right refers to two historically distinct conservative political movements.[3] Both American New Rights are distinct from and opposed to the more moderate tradition of the so-called Rockefeller Republicans. The New Right also differs from the Old Right (1933-1955) on issues concerning foreign policy with the New Right being opposed to the non-interventionism of the Old Right.[4]
    ] The first New Right
    The first New Right (1955-1964) was centered around the libertarians, traditionalists, and anti-communists at William F. Buckley’s National Review.[5] The first New Right embraced „fusionism” (classical liberal economics, traditional social values, and an ardent anti-communism)[6] and coalesced through grassroots organizing in the years preceding the 1964 presidential campaign of Barry Goldwater. The Goldwater campaign, though failing to unseat incumbent President Lyndon B. Johnson, galvanized the formation of a new political movement.
    First New Right figures:
    William F. Buckley, Jr. – editor of National Review
    Frank Meyer – anti-communist libertarian and creator of the „fusionist” political theory
    James Burnham – anti-communist political theorist
    M. Stanton Evans – journalist and writer of Young Americans for Freedom’s „Sharon Statement”
    Barry Goldwater – U.S. Senator from Arizona and 1964 Republican U.S. presidential nominee
    [The second New Right
    The second New Right (1964 to the present) was formed in the wake of the Goldwater campaign and had a more populist tone than the first New Right. The second New Right tended to focus on social issues and national sovereignty (i.e. the Panama Canal treaty) and was often linked with the Religious Right.[7] The second New Right formed a policy approach and electoral apparatus that brought Ronald Reagan into the White House in the 1980 presidential election. In elite think-tanks and local community organizations alike, new policies, marketing strategies, and electoral strategies were crafted over the succeeding decades to promote strongly conservative policies. Though mostly ignored by scholars until the late 1980s, the formation of the New Right is now one of the fastest-growing areas of historical research.
    Second New Right figures:
    Richard Viguerie – direct mail activist
    Howard Phillips – founder of the Conservative Caucus
    Terry Dolan – founder of the National Conservative Political Action Committee
    Phyllis Schlafly – anti-feminist activist and founder of the Eagle Forum
    Paul Weyrich – founder of the Heritage Foundation and Free Congress Education and Research Foundation
    Ronald Reagan – President of the USA
    The „third” New Right
    A third group often labeled „New Right” are a group of theorists and scholars whose work on public policy issues such as crime and the family assisted policy makers in the 1970s and 1980s. Their work came to prominence around the same time that the second New Right emerged and came into power.
    „Third” New Right theories
    Family – Much like functionalists, New Right theorists see the family as the cornerstone of society. The nuclear family is the ‘normal family’ in the view of the New Right. For example, according to John Redwood: ‘the natural state should be the two-adult family caring for their children’. The New Right sees the family in a state of deterioration. They point to the following evidence to support their claims: lone-parent families, fatherless families, and divorce rates.
    Criticisms of the New Right’s views on the family include arguments that they tend to blame the victims of disadvantaged families, and that they hold an idealized view of the past.
    Crime and Deviance
    ‘Thinking about Crime’ – 1975 – James Q. Wilson. Wilson denies that trying to eradicate evils such as poverty will help to reduce crime. According to him, programs to reduce poverty in the U.S. lead to subsequent rising levels of crime. He therefore believes crime can neither be explained nor tackled by the nanny state. Wilson sees crime as a result of rational calculations. People will commit crime if the benefits outweigh the risk involved. Therefore, suggesting remedies like harsher sentences would help resolve crime. Wilson sees the main problems of crime as undermining communities – ‘[crime]prevents the formation and maintenance of community’. With the absence of community, crime rates soar.
    Murray – 1990, 2001. According to Murray, increased numbers of young, healthy, low-income people choose not to take jobs, but instead turn to crime; in particular, street crime and regular drug abuse. According to Murray, this is a result of the increase of lone parent families without a father figure. As a result, the young males lack role models that demonstrate how to live in society correctly. Murray believes the welfare dependency that these young men have lived on throughout their childhood has led them to a lack of work ethos, and subsequently pushed them towards a life of crime.
    Wilson – 1985. In Wilson’s more recent work, he has moved towards a biological explanation for the causes of crime. He argues that people are born with a natural predisposition for crime. This potential can only be realised through poor socialization provided by inadequate families – e.g., single-parent families. Wilson also goes on to say how the welfare state has led to the easy life for many people. There is no longer the hard work needed to hold down a job, and one can live solely off the state. Also, from an increasingly affluent society, the potential gains of crime are increasing, and thus inviting more people to a life of crime.
    „Third” New Right figures:
    James Q. Wilson – advisor to Reagan. Ideas very unpopular among left-wing British sociologists.
    Charles Murray – New Right theorist, spoke about family, crime, and deviance.
    George Erdos Norman Dennis – a few of New Right thinkers who were sociologists rather than politicians and journalists. Wrote about families without fathers.
    In Ukraine there is a metapolitical organization named „Ukrainian New Right – Mesogaia”, whose leader is a philosophical-political writer, Oleg Gutsulyak. The semi-official organs of the party is the monthlies („Mesogaia-Sarmatia”), („LNE-UA”) which also publishes articles in Ukrainian and Russian languages. Ukrainian New Right are collaborate with the Eastern European Metapolitical Association New Right „Thule-Sarmatia” [1] (Ukraine – Bulgaria – Russia – Azerbajdzhan – Tatarstan).
    ] See also
    • American Conservative Union
    • Conservative Caucus
    • Eagle Forum
    • Free Congress Foundation
    • Heritage Foundation
    • National Review
    • Neoconservatism
    • New Left
    • Religious Right
    • Sharon Statement
    • Young Americans for Freedom
    Richards, David/Martin J. Smith. 2002. Governance and Public Policy in the UK. New York: Oxford University Press. pp: 92-121.
    1. ^ The New Right in the New Europe By Sean Hanley
    2. ^ John Quiggin – Journal Articles 1997 – Economic rationalism
    3. ^ Frohnen, Bruce, Jeremy Beer, and Jeffrey O. Nelson (2006) American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia. ISI Books: Wilmington, DE, pp. 624-625.
    4. ^ Frohnen, Bruce, Jeremy Beer, and Jeffrey O. Nelson (2006) American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia. ISI Books: Wilmington, DE, p. 625.
    5. ^ Frohnen, Bruce, Jeremy Beer, and Jeffrey O. Nelson (2006) American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia. ISI Books: Wilmington, DE, p. 624.
    6. ^ Frohnen, Bruce, Jeremy Beer, and Jeffrey O. Nelson (2006) American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia. ISI Books: Wilmington, DE, pp. 338-641.
    7. ^ Gottfried, Paul and Thomas Fleming (1988) The Conservative Movement. Twayne Publishers: Boston, pp. 77-95.

    Populism From Wikipedia,

    Populism, defined either as an ideology[1][2][3][4], a political philosophy[5][6][7] or a mere type of discourse[8][9], is a type of political-social thought which juxtaposes „the people” with „the elites”, urging social and political system changes and/or a rhetorical style deployed by members of political or social movements. It is defined by the Cambridge dictionary as „political ideas and activities that are intended to represent ordinary people’s needs and wishes” [10]

    Academic definitions
    Academic and scholarly definitions of populism widely vary and, among both journalists and scholars, the term is often employed in loose, inconsistent and undefined ways to denote appeals to ‘the people’, ‘demagogy’ and ‘catch-all’ politics or as a receptacle for new types of parties whose classification observers are unsure of. Another factor held to diminish the value of ‘populism’ in some societies is that, as Margaret Canovan notes in her 1981 study Populism, unlike labels such as ‘conservative’ or ‘socialist’, the meanings of which have been ‘chiefly dictated by their adherents’, contemporary populists rarely call themselves ‘populists’ and usually reject the term when it is applied to them by others [11]. Some exceptions to this pattern of pejorative usage exist, notably in the United States, but it appears likely that this is due to the memories and traditions of earlier democratic movements (e.g. farmers’ movements, New Deal reform movements, and the civil rights movement) that were often called (and called themselves) populist. It may also be due to linguistic confusions of populism with terms such as „popular” [12].
    Due to the attention on populism in the academic world, scholars have made advances in defining the term in ways which can be profitably employed in research and help to distinguish between movements which are populist and those which simply borrow from populism. One of the latest of these is the definition by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell who, in their volume Twenty-First Century Populism, define populism as „an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice” [13]. Rather than viewing populism in terms of specific social bases, economic programs, issues or electorates, as discussions of right-wing populism have tended to do[14], this conception of populism belongs to the tradition of scholars such as Ernesto Laclau[15], Pierre-Andre Taguieff [16], Yves Meny and Yves Surel [17] who have all sought to focus on populism per se, rather than simply as an appendage of other ideologies (such as nationalism, neo-liberalism etc.). In fact, given its central tenet that democracy should reflect the pure and undiluted will of the people, populism can sit easily with ideologies of both Right and Left. Indeed, while leaders of populist movements in recent decades have claimed to be on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, many populists claim to be neither „left wing,” nor „centrist” nor „right wing.”[18][19][20]
    Styles and methods
    Some scholars argue that populist politics wont organize for empowerment represents the return of older „Aristotelian” politics of horizontal interactions among equals who are different, for the sake of public problem solving [21]. Populism has taken left-wing, right-wing, and even centrist[22] forms, as well as forms of politics that bring together groups and individuals of diverse partisan views.[23] The use of populist rhetoric in the United States has recently included references such as „the powerful trial lawyer lobby”[24][25], „the liberal elite,” or „the Hollywood elite”[26]. An example of populist rhetoric on the other side of the political spectrum was the theme of „Two Americas” in the 2004 Presidential Democratic Party campaign of John Edwards.
    Populists are seen by some politicians as a largely democratic and positive force in society, even while a wing of scholarship in political science contends that populist mass movements are irrational and introduce instability into the political process. Margaret Canovan argues that both these polar views are faulty, and has defined two main branches of modern populism worldwide — agrarian and political — and mapped out seven disparate sub-categories:
    • Commodity farmer movements with radical economic agendas such as the US People’s Party of the late 19th century.
    • Subsistence peasant movements, such as the Eastern European Green Rising militias, which followed World War I.
    • Intellectuals who wistfully romanticize hard-working farmers and peasants and build radical agrarian movements like the Russian narodniki.
    • Populist democracy, including calls for more political participation through reforms such as the use of popular referendums.
    • Politicians’ populism marked by non-ideological appeals for „the people” to build a unified coalition.
    • Reactionary populism, such as the white backlash harvested by George Wallace.
    • Populist dictatorship, such as that established by Getulio Vargas in Brazil.[27]
    Fascism and populism
    It is believed by some that populist movements can be precursors for, or building blocks for, fascist movements.[28][29][30] Conspiracist scapegoating employed by various populist movements can create „a seedbed for fascism.”[31] National socialist populism interacted with and facilitated fascism in interwar Germany.[32] In this case, distressed middle–class populists during the pre-Nazi Weimar period mobilized their anger at government and big business. The hoes „parasitized the forms and themes of the populists and moved their constituencies far to the right through ideological appeals involving demagoguery, scapegoating, and conspiracism.”[33] According to Fritzsche:
    The Nazis expressed the populist yearnings of middle–class constituents and at the same time advocated a strong and resolutely anti-Marxist mobilization….Against „unnaturally” divisive parties and querulous organized interest groups, National Socialists cast themselves as representatives of the commonwealth, of an allegedly betrayed and neglected German public….[b]reaking social barriers of status and caste, and celebrating at least rhetorically the populist ideal of the people’s community…[34]
    History in Europe
    Classical populism
    The word populism is derived from the Latin word populus, which means people in English (in the sense of „nation,” as in: „The Roman People” (populus Romanus), not in the sense of „multiple individual persons” as in: „There are people visiting us today”). Therefore, populism espouses government by the people as a whole (that is to say, the masses). This is in contrast to elitism, aristocracy, synarchy or plutocracy, each of which is an ideology that espouse government by a small, privileged group above the masses.
    Populism has been a common political phenomenon throughout history. The Populares were an unofficial faction in the Roman senate whose supporters were known for their populist agenda. Some of the most well known of these were Tiberius Grachus, Gaius Marius, Julius Caesar and Caesar Augustus, all of whom eventually used referendums to bypass the Roman Senate and appeal to the people directly.
    Early modern period
    Populism rose during the Reformation; Protestant groups like the Anabaptists formed ideas about ideal theocratic societies, in which peasants would be able to read the Bible themselves. Attempts of establishing these societies were made during the Peasants’ War (1524-1525) and the Münster Rebellion (1534-1535). However, the peasant movement ultimately failed as cities and nobles made their own peace with the princely armies, which restored the old order under the nominal overlordship of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, represented in German affairs by his younger brother Ferdinand.
    The same conditions which contributed to the outbreak of the English Revolution of 1642-1651, also known as the English Civil War. It led to a proliferation of ideologies and political movements among peasants, self-employed artisans, and working class people in England. Many of these groups had a dogmatic Protestant religious bent. They included Puritans and the Levellers.[citation needed]
    Religious revival
    Romanticism, the anxiety against rationalism, broadened after the beginnings of the European and Industrial Revolutions because of cultural, social, and political insecurity. Romanticism led directly into a strong popular desire to bring about religious revival, nationalism and populism. The ensuing religious revival eventually blended into political populism and nationalism, becoming at times a single entity and a powerful force of public will for change. The paradigm shift brought about was marked by people looking for security and community because of a strong emotional need to escape from anxiety and to believe in something larger than themselves.[citation needed]
    The revival of religiosity all over Europe played an important role in bringing people to populism and nationalism. In France, François-René de Chateaubriand provided the opening shots of Catholic revivalism as he opposed enlightenment’s materialism with the „mystery of life,” the human need for redemption[35]. In Germany, Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher promoted pietism by stating that religion was not the institution, but a mystical piety and sentiment with Christ as the mediating figure raising the human consciousness above the mundane to God’s level[36]. In England, John Wesley’s Methodism split with the Anglican church because of its emphasis on the salvation of the masses as a key to moral reform, which Wesley saw as the answer to the social problems of the day.[37]Rejection of ultramontanism
    Chateaubriand’s beginning brought about two Catholic Revivals in France: first, a conservative revival led by Joseph de Maistre, which defended ultramontanism, also known as the supremacy of the Pope in the church, and a second populist revival led by Felicite de Lamennais, an excommunicated priest. This religious populism opposed ultramontanism and emphasized a church community dependent upon all of the people, not just the elite. Furthermore, it stressed that church authority should come from the bottom-up and that the church should alleviate suffering, not merely accept it, both religious principles based on populism.[38]
    Latin America
    Populism has been an important force in Latin American political history. In Latin America, many charismatic leaders have emerged since the 20th century. Populism in Latin America has been traced by some to concepts taken from Perón’s Third Position.[39] Populist practitioners in Latin America usually adapt politically to the prevailing mood of the nation, moving within the ideological spectrum from left to right many times during their political lives. Latin American countries have not always had a clear and consistent political ideology under populism. Most of these countries cannot be as clearly and easily divided between liberals and conservatives, as in the United States, or between social-democrats and Christian-democrats as in European countries. Nevertheless, the more recent pattern that has emerged in Latin American populists has been decidedly socialist populism[40][41] that appeals to masses of poor by promising redistributive policies[41] and state control of the nation’s energy resources[42].
    Populism has been fiscally supported in Latin America during periods of growth such as the 1950s and 1960s and during commodity price booms such as in oil and precious metals. Political leaders could gather followers among the popular classes with broad redistributive programs during these boom times. Populism in Latin America has been sometimes criticized for the fiscal policies of many of its leaders, but has also been defended for having allowed historically weak states to buy off disorder and achieve a tolerable degree of stability while initiating large-scale industrialization. Thus though specific populist fiscal and monetary policies may be criticized by economic historians, populism has also allowed leaders and parties to co-opt the radical ideas of the masses so as to redirect them in a non revolutionary direction[43].
    Often adapting a nationalist vocabulary and rhetorically convincing, populism was used to appeal to broad masses while remaining ideologically ambivalent. Notwithstanding, there have been notable exceptions. 21st Century Latin-American populist leaders have had a decidedly socialist bent.[40][41]
    When populists do take strong positions on economic philosophies such as capitalism versus socialism, the position sparks strong emotional responses regarding how best to manage the nation’s current and future social and economic position. Mexico’s 2006 Presidential election was hotly debated (even if only among its social elite) among Mexicans who supported and opposed populist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador.[44]
    Populism in Latin American countries has both an economic and an ideological edge. The situation is similar in many countries with the legacies of poor and low-growth economies: highly unequal societies in which people are divided between a relative few wealthy families and masses of poor (with some exceptions such as Argentina, where strong and educated middle classes are a significant segment of the population).[45]
    Other perspectives trace inequality to the formation of Latin America’s governments and institutions, which were shaped by the Spanish crown upon the conquest of the Americas by the Spaniards. Latin America was not meant to be a colony for the settlers to live in and develop, like the United States, but a source of resources for the Spanish crown. After the nations obtained their independence, many negative colonial social legacies survived.[46]
    Populists can be very successful political candidates in such countries. In appealing to the masses of poor people prior to gaining power, populists may promise widely-demanded food, housing, employment, basic social services, and income-redistribution. Once in political power, they may not always be financially or politically able to fulfill all these broad promises. However, they are very often successful in stretching to provide many broad and basic services[47][48].
    Economics debate on populism and socialist populism
    In Mexico, Brazil and Argentina in a relatively short period of time, populist leaders were perceived to have delivered more to their lower class constituents than previous governments. Critics of populist policies point to the infamous consequences of spending and lack of reform on these countries’ respective finances involving growing debt, pressured currencies, and hyperinflation, which in turn led to high interest rates, low growth, and debt crisis. The 1980s in Latin America became referred to as a lost decade during which the region experienced low economic growth and few if any reductions in poverty while the Asian Tigers have been consistently developing through high rates of savings, investments, and educational achievements. Supporters of past economic policies would point to the uncontrollable economic consequences of high oil prices to much of the world economy during the 1970s and the unanticipated fall in commodity prices that would later complicate financing past spending[49][50].
    Reacting to the legacy of the debt-crisis and slow growth during the 1980s, many Latin American governments privatized state-owned enterprises, such as electricity and telecommunications during the wave of privatizations that occurred in those countries in the 1990s, and opened to trade. This has also been done outside Latin America, from Britain and the U.S. (during the Margaret Thatcher/Ronald Reagan years) to Russia and China’s (accelerating economic liberalization during the 1990s) to speed economic growth and employment[51].
    Often this neoliberal reforms brought within itself the seeds of crisis; for example, in the Argentinian Corralito crisis, the government was forced to withdraw after three days of popular riots. In Mexico, tortilla price increases have sparked protests demanding price-controls which the leadership instead handled with a gentleman’s agreement with major manufacturers capping prices for a fixed time period[52]
    The economic debate continues as reforms to weak and closed Latin American economies opened up to external shocks and competition such as through privatizations and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in Mexico and other trade agreements and privatizations throughout Latin America. While orthodox economics point to longer term gains for quickly modernizing countries like Chile, slower moving countries have considered retracting from the initial shocks. Some blame a „neo-liberal” economic model favored by an unpopular US government. The „neo-liberal” tag, along with the label of the „Washington Consensus” have been used to criticize harsh economic policies on the one hand, and on the other hand some have used to demonize orthodox economic science and policies by tying them directly to the unpopular U.S. government which faces widespread distrust in Latin America[53][54]. Indeed throughout the world, orthodox economists generally agree that the older socialist policies favored by many populists have hindered Latin American economies[55] and that today further neo-liberal economic reforms would be needed to compete in the international arena for more jobs and faster growth. Support for Latin-American socialism continues within economic circles of both Latin America itself and elsewhere, that rely on pro-socialist works such as „Whither Socialism?” by Joseph Stiglitz.[56].
    US policy
    The US has intervened in Latin American governments on many occasions where populism has threatened its interests: the interventions in Guatemala, when the populist Arbenz government was overthrown by a coup backed by the American company United Fruit and the American ambassador in 1954, and Augusto Pinochet’s Chilean coup in 1973 are just two cases of American intervention. Daniel Ortega’s Sandinista government in Nicaragua was also viewed as a threat to US foreign policy during the Cold War, leading the United States to place an embargo on trade with the Sandinista’s Soviet-sponsored regime in 1985[57][58] as well as supporting anti-Sandinista rebels. One last example of US intervention has been seen in Colombia particularly since the assassination of the populist leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in April 1948. Gaitan supported land reform and other socialist initiatives which posed a threat to American interests; it is for this reason that Gaitan’s assassination is alleged to have been a CIA plot. To this day Colombia continues to be the US’s most important ally in the region with continuous military aid under Plan Colombia.
    Strength and current socialist tendency
    Populism has nevertheless remained a significant force in Latin America. Populism has recently been re-appearing on the left with promises of far-reaching socialist changes as seen in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez. These socialist changes have included policies nationalizing energy resources such as oil to enable a socialist „transformation.” The Venezuelan government often spars verbally with the United States and accuses it of attempting to overthrow Chavez after supporting a failed coup against him. Chavez himself has been one of the most outspoken and blunt critics of U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, a large commodity trade continues between Venezuela and the U.S. due to the economic constraints of oil delivery and the proximity of the two countries.[59]
    In the 21st century, the large numbers of voters living in extreme poverty in Latin America has remained a bastion of support for new populist candidates. By early 2008 governments with varying forms of populism and with some form of left leaning social democratic or democratic socialist platform had come to dominate virtually all Latin American nations with the exceptions of Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico.[60] This political shift includes both more developed nations such as Brazil with its ruling Workers’ Party, Argentina’s Front for Victory and Chile with its Socialist Party, and smaller income countries like Bolívia with its Movement towards Socialism and Paraguay with the Patriotic Alliance for Change. Populist candidates have been defeated in middle-income countries such as Mexico, in part by comparing them to Venezuela’s controversial Hugo Chavez, whose socialist policies have been used to scare the middle class[citation needed]. Nevertheless, populist candidates have been more successful in poorer Latin American countries such as Bolivia (under Morales), Ecuador (under Correa) and Nicaragua (under Ortega). By the use of broad grassroots movements populist groups have managed to gain power from better organized, funded and entrenched groups such as the Bolivian Nationalist Democratic Action and the Paraguayan Colorado Party [61]
    As a general rule, countries in Latin America with high rates of poverty, whose governments maintain and support unpopular privatizations and more orthodox economic policies which don’t deliver general gains through society will be under pressure from populist politicians and movements[62] accusing them of benefiting the upper and upper-middle classes[63][64] and of being allied to foreign and business interests[65][66].
    In Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s candidacy sparked very emotional debates throughout the country regarding policies that affect ideology, class, equality, wealth, and society. Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador’s most controversial economic policies included his promise to expand monthly stipends to the poor and elderly from Mexico City to the rest of the country and to re-negotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement to protect the Mexican poor.
    The ruling party in Mexico, the National Action Party (PAN), portrayed him as a danger to Mexico’s hard-earned economic stability. In criticizing his redistributive promises that would create new entitlement programs somewhat similar to social security in the US (though not as broad in scope) and his trade policies that would not fully uphold prior agreements (such as NAFTA), the economic debate between capitalists and socialists became a major part of the debate. Felipe Calderon , the PAN candidate, portrayed himself as not just a standard-bearer for recent economic policy, but rather more fully as a more pro-active candidate so as to distance himself from the main criticisms of his predecessor Vicente Fox regarding inaction. He labeled himself the „jobs president” and promised greater national wealth for all through steady future growth, fiscal prudence, international trade, and balanced government spending.
    During the immediate aftermath of the tight elections in which the country’s electoral court was hearing challenges to the vote tally that had Calderon winning, Obrador showed the considerable influence over the masses that are a trademark of populist politicians. He effectively led huge demonstrations filling the central plaza with masses of sympathizers who supported his challenge. The demonstrations lasted for several months and eventually dissipated after the electoral court did not find sufficient cause from the challenges presented to overturn the results.[67][68]
    United States

    The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. (August 2009)

    Later there was the Greenback Party, the Progressive Party of 1912 led by Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive Party of 1924 led by Robert M. La Follette, Sr., and the Share Our Wealth movement of Huey Long in 1933-35.
    George Wallace, Four-Term Governor of Alabama, led a populist movement that carried five states and won 13.5% of the popular vote in the 1968 presidential election. Campaigning against intellectuals and liberal reformers, Wallace gained a large share of the white working class vote in Democratic primaries in 1972.[69][70][71]
    Populism continues to be a force in modern U.S. politics, especially in the 1992 and 1996 third-party presidential campaigns of billionaire Ross Perot. The 1996, 2000, 2004, and the 2008 presidential campaigns of Ralph Nader had a strong populist cast. The 2004 campaigns of Dennis Kucinich[72][73][74][75] and Al Sharpton also had populist elements. The 2004 and 2008 Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards has been described by many[76] (and by himself) as a «one economic community, one commonwealth»[76] populist.[citation needed]
    Comparison between earlier surges of Populism and those of today are complicated by shifts in what are thought to be the interests of the common people. Jonah Goldberg and others argue that in modern society, fractured as it is into myriad interest groups and niches, any attempt to define the interests of the „average person” will be so general as to be useless.[citation needed]
    Over time, there have been several versions of a Populist Party in the United States, inspired by the People’s Party of the 1890s. This was the party of the early U.S. populist movement in which millions of farmers and other working people successfully enacted their anti-trust agenda.[citation needed]
    In 1984, the Populist Party name was revived by Willis Carto, and was used in 1988 as a vehicle for the presidential campaign of former Ku Klux Klan leader, and later member of both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, David Duke. Right-wing Patriot movement organizer Bo Gritz was briefly Duke’s running mate. This maligned incarnation of Populism was widely regarded as a vehicle for white supremacist recruitment. In this instance, populism was maligned using a definition of „the people” which was not the prevailing definition.[citation needed]
    Another populist mechanism was the initiative and referendum driven term-limits movement of the early 1990s. In every state where term-limits were on the ballot, the measure to limit incumbency in Congress passed. The average vote was 67% in favor. However, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down term limits in 1995. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton[77].
    In 1995, the Reform Party of the United States of America (RPUSA) was organized after the populist presidential campaign of Ross Perot in 1992. In the year 2000, an intense fight for the presidential nomination made Patrick J. Buchanan the RPUSA standard-bearer. As result of his nomination as party candidate there were many party splits, not only from Buchanan supporters after he left the party, but also moderates, progressivists and libertarians around Jesse Ventura who refused to collaborate with the Buchanan candidacy. Since then the party’s fortunes have markedly declined.
    In the 2000s, new populist parties were formed in America, including the Populist Party of America in 2002, the Populist Party of Maryland (formed to support Ralph Nader in 2004 and which ran candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, U.S. Senate and state delegate in the 2006 elections, and the American Populist Party in 2009. Since the 2008 elections named Independent Party of Maryland), and the American Populist Renaissance in 2005[78][79]. The American Moderation Party, also formed in 2005, adopted several populist ideals, chief among them working against multinational neo-corporatism.
    Further information: Völkisch movement
    Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, a Lutheran Minister, a professor at the University of Berlin and the „father of gymnastics,” introduced the Volkstum, a racial nation that draws on the essence of a people that was lost in the Industrial Revolution. Adam Mueller went a step further by positing the state as a bigger totality than the government institution. This paternalistic vision of aristocracy concerned with social orders had a dark side in that the opposite force of modernity was represented by the Jews, who were said to be eating away at the state.[80] Populism also played a role in mobilizing middle class support for the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany.[81]. In this case, distressed middle–class populists during the pre-Nazi Weimar period mobilized their anger at government and big business. According to Fritzsche:
    The Nazis expressed the populist yearnings of middle–class constituents and at the same time advocated a strong and resolutely anti-Marxist mobilization…. Against “unnaturally” divisive parties and querulous organized interest groups, National Socialists cast themselves as representatives of the commonwealth, of an allegedly betrayed and neglected German public….[b]reaking social barriers of status and caste, and celebrating at least rhetorically the populist ideal of the people’s community…[34]
    In the late 18th century, the French Revolution, though led by wealthy intellectuals, could also be described as a manifestation of populist sentiment against the elitist excesses and privileges of the Ancien Régime.[82]
    In France, the populist and nationalist picture was more mystical, metaphysical and literarian in nature[83]. Historian Jules Michelet (sometimes called a populist[84]) fused nationalism and populism by positing the people as a mystical unity who are the driving force of history in which the divinity finds its purpose.[85] For Michelet, in history, that representation of the struggle between spirit and matter, France has a special place because the French became a people through equality, liberty, and fraternity. Because of this, he believed, the French people can never be wrong. Michelet’s ideas are not socialism or rational politics, and his populism always minimizes, or even masks, social class differences.
    In the 1950s, Pierre Poujade was the leader of the right-wing populist movement UDCA.[86]
    Jean Marie Le Pen (who was UDCA’s youngest deputy in the 1950s)[87] can be characterized as right-wing populist[88] or extreme-right populist[89].
    See also
    • Black populism
    • Bolivarian Revolution
    • Communitarianism — a partially related political philosophy
    • Charismatic authority
    • Christian Democracy
    • Christian Socialism
    • Christian right
    • Conservatism
    • Cultural production and nationalism
    • Demagogy — as an abstract kind of untruthful speech
    • Fascism
    • Far right
    • Giuseppe Garibaldi
    • Giuseppe Mazzini
    • Gaullism — main French populist philosophy and practice
    • Geert Wilders
    • Jacobin (politics)
    • Jim Hightower — American contemporary progressive populist writer and researcher
    • José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia
    • Kemalist ideology (Kemalism) — one of its principles is populism
    • Liberation theology
    • List of revolutions and rebellions
    • Marxism
    • Muhammad Ali Jinnah
    • Nationalism
    • Nazism
    • Neo-populism
    • Orator
    • People’s Party — frequently used by populist parties
    • Popular democracy
    • Populist Party
    • Poujadism — producerist type of French populism
    • Producerism
    • Progressivism
    • Religious left
    • Right-wing populism
    • Nicolas Sarkozy
    • Seattle’s Poet Populist
    • Social Democracy
    • Socialism
    • Thatcherism — a neoliberal conservative ideology both opposed to socialist types of populism and itself authoritarian populist
    • Union Organizer
    • Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

    Statut social (Social status)

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    Statutul social este onoarea şi prestigiul ataşat poziţiei unei persoane în societate.

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    Social status

    In sociology or anthropology, social status is the honor or prestige attached to one’s position in society (one’s social position).
    Social status, the position or rank of a person or group within the society, can be determined two ways. One can earn their social status by their own achievements, which is known as achieved status. Alternatively, one can be placed in the stratification system by their inherited position, which is called ascribed status.

    Status in different societies
    Status refers to the relative rank that an individual holds; this includes attendant rights, duties, and lifestyle, in a social hierarchy based upon honor or prestige. Status has two different types that come along with it: achieved, and ascribed. The word status refers to social stratification on a vertical scale.
    In modern societies, occupation is usually thought of as the main determinant of status, but other memberships or affiliations (such as ethnic group, religion, gender, voluntary associations, fandom, hobby) can have an influence. The importance of social status can be seen in the peer status hierarchy of geeks, athletes, cheerleaders, nerds, and weirdos in American high schools.[1][2] Achieved status is when people are placed in the stratification structure based on their individual merits or achievements. This status can be achieved through education, occupation, and marital status. Their place within the stratification structure is determined by society’s bar which often judges them on success, success being financial, academic, political and so on. People who achieve a high hierarchical social status often display the following qualities: confidence, generosity, intelligence, mental and emotional stability, and happiness.[3] America most commonly uses this form of status with jobs. The higher up your are in rank the better off you are and the more control you have over your co-workers.
    In pre-modern societies, status differentiation is widely varied. In some cases it can be quite rigid and class based, such as with the Indian caste system. In other cases, status exists without class and/or informally, as is true with some Hunter-Gatherer societies such as the Khoisan, and some Indigenous Australian societies. In these cases, status is limited to specific personal relationships. For example, a Khoisan man is expected to take his wife’s mother quite seriously (a non-joking relationship), although the mother-in-law has no special „status” over anyone except her son-in-law—and only then in specific contexts. All societies have a form of social status.
    Status is an important idea in social stratification. Max Weber distinguishes status from social class[citation needed], though some contemporary empirical sociologists add the two ideas to create socioeconomic status or SES, usually operationalised as a simple index of income, education and occupational prestige.
    [Income and status
    Main article: Status inconsistency
    Inborn and acquired status
    Statuses based on inborn characteristics, such as gender, are called ascribed statuses, while statuses that individuals gained through their own efforts are called achieved statuses. Specific behaviors are associated with social stigmas which can affect status.
    Ascribed Status is when one’s position is inherited through family. Monarchy is a widely-recognized use of this method, to keep the rulers in one family. This usually occurs at birth without any reference as to how that person may turn out to be a good or bad leader.
    Social mobility and social status
    Status can be changed through a process of Social Mobility. Social mobility is change of position within the stratification system. A move in status can be upward (upward mobility), or downward (downward mobility). Social mobility allows a person to move to another social status other than the one he or she was born in. Social mobility is more frequent in societies where achievement rather than ascription is the primary basis for social status.
    Social mobility is especially prominent in the United States in recent years with an ever-increasing number of women entering into the workplace as well as a steady increase in the number of full-time college students.[4][5] This increased education as well as the massive increase in multiple household incomes has greatly contributed to the rise in social mobility obtained by so many today. With this upward mobility; however, comes the philosophy of „Keeping up with the Joneses” that so many Americans obtain. Although this sounds good on the surface, it actually poses a problem because millions of Americans are in credit card debt due to conspicuous consumption and purchasing goods that they do not have the money to pay for.
    Social stratification
    Main article: Social stratification
    Social stratification describes the way in which people are placed with society. It is associated with the ability of individuals to live up to some set of ideals or principles regarded as important by the society or some social group within it. The members of a social group interact mainly within their own group and to a lesser degree with those o

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